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FORUM
SHOULD TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 BE
REPEALED?
RICHARD

A.

EPSTEIN*

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY**

Professor Richard Epstein's 1992 book Forbidden Grounds: The
Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws, boldly challenges the
existing social consensus in favor of laws against employment discrimination. On November 19, 1992, the University of Southern Californiachapter of the Federalist Society sponsored a debate on Professor Epstein's
proposal to repeal all employment discrimination laws. Approximately
300 students attended the debate, which was made possible by the generous
support of the John M. Olin Foundation.
Editors' Note: Professors Epstein and Chemerinsky have agreed to
publishfurther rebuttals in the Fall 1993 issue of the Southern California
Interdisciplinary Law Journal.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS SHOULD BE REPEALED
In this brief talk, I want to outline some of the reasons why I think
that the present body of antidiscrimination laws should be repealed insofar as it applies to private employers who operate in competitive markets.
The simplest way to justify that position is to give a comparison between
the operation of the antidiscrimination laws and the usual tort prohibitions against the use of force. In my view the differences in the operation
of these two types of laws largely explain why the antidiscrimination laws
should be repealed. The fact that there is a strong social consensus in
*

*

James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Legion Lex Professor of Law, USC Law Center.
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favor of the civil rights acts, and the antidiscrimination principle they are
said to embody, offers, if anything, an additional reason for their repeal,
and none for their continued enforcement.
In making this general claim I want to stress again that the focus
here is on private employment. I am not concerned with voting rights or
with any other subject, such as aid to educational institutions that are
covered by the Civil Rights Acts themselves. In many cases the analysis
that I have given will carry over, but in other cases it may not. It is best
therefore to focus on one area, and leave all else aside.
Returning then to our basic inquiry, I should state at the outset that
my basic political orientation is libertarian, but that as a limited-state
libertarian, I do not believe that there should be no government at all. I
do not believe that we could endure a state of affairs in which all individuals have no legal rights and no legal duties. I do not believe in a legal
regime of anarchy, without any regime of government. But I do think
that the central legal prohibition on certain individual conduct does
derive directly from the Hobbesian concern with the use of force and, I
will add, fraud, in a state of nature.
Given this orientation, the central question is a comparison in the
positions of two kinds of victims, those of force and those of discrimination in employment markets. The dissimilarities will dominate. In order
to see why, ask first why it is that we all fear the use of force. I think that
the explanation is not difficult or complicated: some people could kill us.
So now the question is, what steps do we have to take in order to control
these people. One approach is to adopt a market orientation and to say
that we should all enter private contracts to secure our self-protection.
But immediately the question is, with whom should the contract be
made? In a world in which you are looking at force as the major source
of horror, the people you are concerned with are not your friends, but
generally speaking, your enemies. So the first person with whom you
must contract has to be the person who is most intent on doing you
harm. You would have to find some mix of bribes and threats that would
lead him to renounce the use of force against you, and to keep his promise. Only then could you start to breathe easily.
But not for long, for there are lots of people out there who could do
you ill, so that even if you enter into a contract with one or another of
them, there will remain others who are every bit as hostile to you, and
with the same designs on your person and property. So what now? It
turns out that you need a second arrangement, and then a third, and then
a fourth. In a world in which, I am sorry to say, there is a great deal of
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bigotry and a great deal of intolerance, and impatience and stupidity, you
will not be able to make, let alone enforce, enough contracts with enough
persons to keep all these potential enemies at bay. There is in effect a
huge set of transactional barriers that block the voluntary creation of a
complicated network of contracts whereby everyone agrees to a mutual
renunciation of force. So owing to these barriers, we have come to recognize the need for the state, and the coercive transactions it uses to insure
peace. The state imposes taxes (hence the reason for calling me a limited-government libertarian) on us all for the benefit of the common
good, which in this particular case is to create a monopoly of force that
prohibits the private aggression by one individual against another. It is
perhaps somewhat paradoxical that a strong libertarian like myself who
generally thinks that state intervention is a "bad" must nonetheless concede that it is possible to identify some circumstances in which the collective use of force is a manifest good. The failure of coordination by
private agreement is what drives us to a social contract.
The difficulties here are very pronounced, for even if voluntary
agreements could be reached to satisfy ninety-nine percent of the population, the reluctance of the other one percent to go along could undo all or
much of the gains from the agreements otherwise reached. Owing to
these instabilities, a strong social consensus does not create a viable equilibrium. The misbehavior of a single individual can undo the precarious
social peace which commands wide social support. It is truly a case
where all must be bound in order for any to be protected.
Now when we switch to the antidiscrimination laws in employment
we face a very different social phenomenon. In order to see what it is, it
is important to recall what the basic structure of the Civil Rights Acts
provides. It does not deal with the punishment of individuals who act
out of bad motives; there are indeed many situations (especially those
involving the use of force) where the presence of a bad motive can make
an illegal action worse. Thus to refer for a moment to the celebrated
R.A. V case in the Supreme Court,' the bad motive of a deliberate trespasser can surely aggravate the nature of the offense. If you want to
enter the property of someone else out of hatred or spite, the traditional
tort law treated the motive as making the actions worse, even if they
could not make a legal act illegal.2
1. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Allen v. Flood, [1898] App. Cas. 1 (H.L. 1897) (extensive discussion of the proposition in connection with refusals to deal in relation to labor disputes).
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So now it is important to keep the Civil Rights Acts in perspective.
They are not concerned with cases of aggravated assault for racial
motives or something of that sort. Instead as the statute itself recognizes,
we are dealing with cases where someone "fails to or refuses to" deal
with another person because of-and you may now fill in the blanksrace, creed, religion, age, handicap, intelligence, or indeed anything that
you want. The precise content of the particular prohibition has relatively
little to do with the basic structure of the law.
What basic structure? The key feature concerns the kinds of
searches and the kinds of conduct open to individuals to improve their
positions. Recall-and it is critical to the argument-that we are in a
world in which all persons have secured a liberty of the person by a prohibition against the use of force. What is the analogous danger that we
face from private discrimination?
Initially, note that in this situation, you are looking at a world of
hundreds, and thousands, and millions of people, some of whom hate
you quite as much as they did in an unregulated state of nature. The
question still remains, what can they do with their hatred? By definition
they can at most refuse to do business with you. The change in the
nature of the legal rules changes the nature of the contracts that you
must seek in order to better yourself. In effect what you must now do is
to search the other side of the market to try to find those individuals
whose inclinations are most favorable to your welfare. You can spurn all
of those whose inclinations are hostile to your own welfare. In this setting the relevant imagery is very different from that involved when the
use of force is allowed. If you can find a tiny segment of the population
which will do business with you on favorable terms, then the fact that
many others refuse to deal with you will not result generally in any systematic diminution of your wealth. Now you need not enter into a mass
of contracts to keep the enemy at bay, but only one, or a few contracts, to
sell your labor to some willing employer.
So how should we expect the world to play out even if there is some
conscious discrimination so that whites (for example) prefer to do business with whites. In order to see what is going on here, it is critical to
return to a central distinction introduced by Gary Becker in his early
analysis of discrimination:3 one possible outcome of discrimination is a
wage differential, and the other is a separation of blacks and whites (to
take a simple example) into different firms. His argument was that even
3.

See

GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION

57-58 (2d ed. 1971).
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if you could show that many employers wished to discriminate against
some portion of the population, so long as there is free entry into the
market (that is many parties looking for contracts) the wages between
the two groups will in equilibrium be the same, adjusting for productivity
variables, even though you might find some level of market separation
between blacks and whites. In a competitive situation, his position was
that you could find market separation, but not wage differentiation.
Now, with some trepidation, I would like to suggest that what
Becker said is wrong on one point. He said that in a world of pure competition, you would expect all forms of discrimination to cease, because
the firms that engage in discrimination in competitive markets would find
themselves at a systematic disadvantage relative to their rivals. He is
clearly correct that competition will have an enormous effect on the way
in which the market operates, so much so that I am in favor of some
antidiscrimination or nondiscrimination provision to the extent that
there is monopoly or restricted entry that allows one firm, or union, to
have some control over price or contract terms. The point is that once
the monopolist is a sole person with whom you can deal, various forms of
discrimination do become possible, and these lead to inferior allocative
outcomes to situations in which competitive forces are allowed to work.
But does it follow that in a competitive world we would expect to
see a color-blind or race-blind equilibrium, of the sort that was generally
thought desirable in the social discussion around the time that Congress
enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It is of course difficult to predict in
the abstract the precise form that the market behavior and discrimination
will take. Indeed most of the standard models on the subject tried to
identify various imperfections that could explain the persistence of discrimination: all employers were white males with preferences for their
own kind; or that all customers had preferences for white over black, or
male over female, or some other assumptions that were every bit as austere and improbable.
It turns out that these depictions of the market are, however, wholly
inconsistent with any assumption of free entry into the marketplace. If
anyone can become an employer, then we should expect to find lots of
persons becoming employers whose preferences run very much at crosscurrents with the simple, uniform descriptions of the market, and each of
these employers will seek out some niche where he, or she, can enjoy
some temporary advantage relative to some equally determined rivals.
Given this added measure of complexity, I would predict that there
would still be some situations with good old-fashioned bigotry. But by
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the same token it would be very difficult in the abstract to identify which
persons would be practitioners of that not-so-subtle art, and who would
turn out to be its victims. It is not correct in my judgment to assume that
the historical record speaks for itself about the way in which an unregulated competitive labor market will work. Anyone who examines closely
the operation of the market in the Jim Crow South, and indeed in many
segments of the North, will discover that there were many very heavyhanded forms of government intervention that at every level were
designed to frustrate the condition of free entry-thus creating the conditions that call for the imposition of some antidiscrimination law.
But if the world could be freed of these oppressive forms of direct
regulation, then my prediction would be this: there are many people in
this country who are deeply sensitive to what I regard as the manifest
injustices that took place on issues of racial policy over long periods of
our history. Nobody in his right mind could say, I think, that Jim Crow
was the embodiment of laissez-faire politics. Nobody could say that the
Davis-Bacon Act of 193 1,' which was passed with explicit racial animus, 5 was the embodiment of a free and open economy. Open up the
economy for real, however, and I predict that certain paradoxes that
trouble a great many people will be resolved in a coherent fashion.
First, it seems that you will find some firms-typically small firms in
specialized niches-may practice same-type discrimination. You would
expect to find Korean firms, Jewish firms, black firms, and all women
firms. But if, in the alternative, these larger organizations must engage in
mass marketing in an age of diversity, then the exact opposite is likely to
be the case. These firms will cater to all sorts of different people in order
to allow for the largest level of outreach. Who one is becomes relevant to
what one can do. The airtight division of 1964 between merit on the one
hand, and all extraneous considerations on the other hand, will pass into
the mists of history.
It follows therefore that firms seeking to reach out to all segments of
the market will find it in their interest to take into account race. They
may well choose to adopt race-conscious policies and adopt diverse hiring strategies. They may well choose to adopt some kind of affirmative
action program, although one far different, I suspect, from those which
4. Pub. L. No. 798, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a276c (1988)).
5. See 74 CONG. REC. 5613 (1931) (statement of Rep. Allgood referring to "cheap colored
labor"); see also JOHN P. GOULD & GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE DAVISBACON AcT 5-9 (1980).
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are routinely required by governments. It may well be that this private
firm will choose to adopt some internal quota system, coupled with rules
sensible to itself but mysterious to any outsider. But as someone who
approaches this set of issues from a libertarian perspective, I do not have
to face the problem that has consumed so much time and energy under
the current antidiscrimination laws. I do not have to explain why it is
that certain people are allowed to act on the strength of these race or sex
preferences, while other persons, whose behavior may or may not be terrible, are denied the like privilege, the like privilege of freedom of
association.
But it is said that there are preferences and preferences; that the
arguments for diversity are vastly stronger than the arguments in favor of
old-fashioned bigotry. One could point to the stain of history and the
need for some rectification. And I must say that in general I have sympathy with this position, although I am ever more distressed by the intolerant way in which the case is often made. But by the same token even if
the arguments for diversity carry some weight, it is important to recognize their intrinsic limitations: while these arguments may justify the
race-conscious practices of the firms that choose to accept their moral
force, they do not justify the coercion of others who do not share this
view of history. One can make the argument from history on the retail
basis, and respond to it at that level. There is no reason to make a strong
point of view, no matter how sound, official state policy.
The simple point of my argument is that if a large portion of the
population thinks that some form of race preference is an appropriate
response to past discrimination, then even if one repealed the antidiscrimination laws tomorrow, you would expect to see many more firms
engage in these desired forms of discrimination than in the opposite
forms. The moral case does not disappear with the statute. But since the
forms of discrimination are not wholly voluntary (with no stick in the
side of those who disagree with the official policy), then we are freed as a
nation of the incredible government colossus that today imposes a huge
tax on us all. Likewise we will be freed of the enormous political risk
that the civil rights statutes that were originally defended as a "mild and
moderate" intervention in the market will create massive intrusions with
respect to testing, pensions, promotions, and every other aspect of the
employment relationship.
These remarks are not idle comments. If you start to look at these
civil rights statutes and ask yourself to consider the drain that they

HeinOnline -- 2 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 355 1993

356 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISCIPLINARY LAW JOURNAL
clearly create, it is necessary to identify some offsetting social improvement that they can deliver. And on this critical point the evidence in
favor of the statute is very, very weak. There were some gains attributable to the passage of the civil rights statutes in the years before 1975. I
think that it is fair to say that virtually all of those gains had to do with
the dismantling of the apparatus of segregation as it existed in the old
South, and with the change in union practices throughout the country.
But by the same token, if you look at the post-1975 period, there are two
critical findings that are in close correlation with each other. There is
both a relative stability in black/white wage differentials, and a decline in
the overall level of wage growth. The reason why these two phenomena
go together is that competitive markets do a far better job in sorting people by tastes, abilities and preferences than any system of heavy-handed
government planning.
The bottom line should be clear. On issue after issue, it is clear that
governments cannot move with assurance and wisdom in response to
changes in external market and technology forces. We know from the
socialist failures of Eastern Europe and the old Soviet Union that centralized planning cannot work. Those arguments carry over to a T with
respect to the antidiscrimination laws as they apply to the employment
relationship. For that reason-and perhaps for that reason only-I think
that these statutes should be forthwith repealed. All of us, regardless of
race, regardless of color, would be far better off under a color-blind state
that enforces a regime that prohibits the private use of force and fraud,
and gives legal protection to voluntary contractual relations in competitive markets.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: SOCIETY NEEDS
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS

I thank the Federalist Society for inviting me to participate today. I
thank all of you for coming. This is probably the largest gathering I've
seen in the ten years I've been here. I think it's wonderful for so many
people to gather to think about and talk about ideas.
Professor Epstein is the foremost libertarian scholar among law
professors today. But any idea taken to an extreme gives absurd results.
What Professor Epstein is arguing for today is the repeal of all employment discrimination laws. He is arguing that employers should be free to
discriminate, in any way they want, based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, disability, or age. He does this by focusing on abstrac-

tions-freedom of contract, the market in theory-but he ignores the
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social realities. I would argue that it is imperative that society have laws
that prohibit employment discrimination. What I want to do is go stepby-step through the justifications for social prohibition of employment
discrimination.
The first step of the analysis is that without legal regulation, significant employment discrimination would exist in the American market
system. Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism and homophobia are realities in
this society. They've long manifested themselves in employment discrimination. Professor Epstein argues that the market system left to its own
devices will eliminate most of that employment discrimination. I think
he is clearly wrong.
Let me point to five flaws in his analysis with regard to the market
system. First, history proves him wrong. We long had an unregulated
market system. Civil rights laws did not exist until 1964 and employment discrimination was pervasive on all of these grounds. The statistics
and real world examples both confirm this. Sandra Day O'Connor graduated high in her class from the Stanford Law School in the early 1950s.
No law firm would hire her except as a legal secretary. Where was the
market system to provide her a job?
Or consider another example, concerning a mutual friend that Professor Epstein and I share, who is now a chaired professor at Yale Law
School. He is about ten years older than I am. He said that when he
graduated from Yale Law School near the top of his class virtually no
law firm would offer him a job because he was Jewish. Where was the
market system when he needed work? The simple reality is, as history
shows us, employment discrimination is pervasive in a free market
system.
A second flaw in Professor Epstein's market analysis is that prejudice distorts employers' evaluation of employees. The reality is that
because of prejudice, employers discount the skills and talents of minorities. Because of prejudice, employers discount the skills and talents of
women, or Jews, or gays and lesbians. And as a result, when prejudice is
pervasive throughout society the market system repeatedly undervalues
contributions of these individuals and as a result these people never get
hired as they should.
Third, Professor Epstein fails to account for customer preferences,
and more importantly, perceived customer preferences. A law firm
believes that its clients don't want to deal with Jewish lawyers. An
employer believes that its customers don't want to deal with those with

HeinOnline -- 2 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 357 1993

358 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISCIPLINARY LAW JOURNAL
disabilities. And as a result, throughout the market you see individuals
who are minorities or disabled or Jewish simply not getting hired.
Fourth, Professor Epstein assumes that the market system through
competition will create enough slots for these individuals. Professor
Epstein says the Korean community will create jobs for Koreans; the
black community will create jobs for blacks. But why believe that
enough jobs will be created within these communities, especially given
pervasive discrimination by the white community against these groups.
For all of these reasons I would say Professor Epstein's market theory is wrong. But I add a fifth reason. Professor Epstein fails to account
for the fact that at times employers would rather discriminate even if it's
costly. Think of a simple example: sexual harassment. Some studies
show that over half of all women in the workplace have been harassed.6
Why do employers do this knowing that they might lose valuable female
employees who might quit as a result? The reason is that their shortterm perceived benefits are greater than their long-term costs. Perhaps
they believe that the workers in the market are sufficiently fungible.
Regardless, they believe that the short term gains are worth the cost to
them, and, thus, they go ahead and discriminate. The market system
produces discrimination.
As I read Professor Epstein's long book I was convinced that a key
thing he fails to take into account is the pervasiveness of discrimination
in the market economy. Then I got to his conclusion and it became clear
to me. On page 503 he writes: "Anyone who works in academic circles,
or I dare say elsewhere, knows full well that all the overt and institutional discrimination comes from those who claim to be the victims of
discrimination imposed by others."7 Professor Epstein says there is no
discrimination against blacks, women or Jews in this society. That's
obviously not true.
My second step in the analysis is that laws should prohibit employment discrimination. I reason in two substeps here: Substep A is that
employment discrimination is terribly harmful. I believe the single most
outrageous part of this book is that it does not take into account the
terrible social harms of employment discrimination.
6. See, e.g., Theodore F. Claypoole, Comment, Inadequaciesin Civil Rights Laws: The Need
for Sexual Harassment Legislation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 1159 (1987).
7. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DisCRIMINATION LAWS 503 (1992) (emphasis in original).
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Professor Epstein refers to employment discrimination as a "preference" or in his words, "a taste of employers." For him, there's no difference between a company choosing white wallpaper as opposed to black
wallpaper, and their choosing white employees over black ones. For him
there's no difference between picking furniture as opposed to picking
employees. And that's wrong. Employment discrimination imposes
enormous costs on society. I think of three.
First, think of the cost to workers who are treated unfairly by being
discriminated against on account of their race, or their gender, or their
religion. Fairness should be one of our concerns in society. An individual who loses income on account of discrimination is being treated
unfairly. Think of the loss of human potential in that person. A person
is not able to pursue his or her calling and find fulfillment because of
discrimination. Think of the enormous dignity harm to that person who
can't get a job or can't get a promotion because of discrimination.
Nowhere does Professor Epstein speak of that.
Think of a second harm, the harm to society's value of equality. We
as a society should be deeply committed to equality. We should adhere
to the principle that likes should be treated alike. Any compromise of
that is unacceptable. This is something that has acceptance from all
parts of the political spectrum. George Bush, certainly no friend of the
laws that prohibit employment discrimination, wrote, "[d]iscrimination,
whether on the basis of race, national origin, sex, religion, or disability, is
worse than wrong. It is a fundamental evil that tears at the fabric of our
society, and one that all Americans should and must oppose." 8
And third, there's enormous economic cost to society from discrimination. When we think of the cost in terms of the potential unfulfilled,
we will never be able to measure what people could have contributed but
didn't. We will never be able to measure the people who didn't look for a
job because they know of discrimination. But we know that it is enormous. Society loses terribly when there's discrimination. For all of these
reasons, discrimination must be regarded as an unacceptable evil.
Substep B of this argument is that freedom of contract should be
interfered with to eliminate employment discrimination. Professor
Epstein begins by saying that the main normative premise for society
should be freedom of contract. But I believe where he goes wrong is that
8. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 26
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1632, 1633 (Oct. 22, 1990).
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he tremendously overweighs the importance of freedom of contract and
he underweighs the harms of discrimination.
At the very least with regard to freedom of contract, I disagree with
his premise that it can only be interfered with to stop force or coercion. I
certainly agree law is necessary and government is necessary to stop force
and coercion. That's not the only time we need laws. The law should
prohibit contracts for slavery even if slavery doesn't involve force or
coercion. We should and do interfere with freedom of contract to protect
the public safety and health. For example, you can't go to the gas station
across the street to buy gasoline that has lead any longer. That interferes
with freedom of contract, but the public health and the environment
demand it. There are numerous instances where we interfere with freedom of contract for the public good. And one of these instances must be
prohibiting employment discrimination.
Furthermore, Professor Epstein's argument with regard to freedom
of contract only focuses on freedom of contract of employers. He ignores
the freedom of contract of employees who are discriminated against.
Imagine Sandra Day O'Connor graduating from law school in the early
1950s. What freedom of contract did she have in the market to get
hired?
Professor Epstein assumes that the only thing that can interfere with
freedom of contract is government laws. Discrimination, even the market system itself, can interfere with freedom of contract. We would
expand the protection of freedom of contract for businesses at the
expense of decreasing freedom of contract for individuals. But even if
that were not true, I believe the evils of employment discrimination justify limiting freedom of contract. The principle of equality is simply
more important in this society than the principle of freedom of contract.
The third step in my argument is that employment discrimination
laws are successful in outlawing employment discrimination. At the
beginning of Professor Epstein's book, he presents the argument that he
advanced today: there's no evidence that employment discrimination
laws succeed. And then later in his book he proves that employment
discrimination laws succeed and he argues they work too well.
He says, for example, that employers are often forced to stop discriminating even when there's no proof of discrimination. He says, for
example, with regard to age discrimination, that over twenty percent of
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the university budgets might have to go to pay the costs of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.9 In other words, statistically, employment discrimination laws work. Moreover, he ignores an enormous body
of evidence that shows that employment discrimination laws have been
successful.
Professor Blumrosen, for example, looks at the success of employment discrimination laws in advancing minorities within professions. 10
He says that within the minority community, millions of dollars of
income have been transferred because of employment discrimination
laws. He shows, with regard to almost every professional category, the
number of minority employees went up as a result of employment discrimination laws. It is always hard to deal with this statistically because
it is always very difficult to measure what doesn't exist, or what the
world would be like without those laws. So think of examples.
Look at the airline industry. As a result of the laws prohibiting
employment discrimination, airlines are now required to hire male flight
attendants. If you fly in airplanes you'll see the employment discrimination laws work there. It used to be that the airlines said that flight
attendants had to retire and leave the service when they got married. No
longer can airlines discriminate in this way. It used to be that airlines
had sex-based weight requirements imposed only on women flight
attendants. That requirement no longer exists. It used to be that a flight
attendant had to leave as soon as she knew she was pregnant. That
requirement no longer exists. I could generalize from this industry to
almost any industry at which the bottom line point is: employment discrimination laws are successful regarding hiring blacks, women, Jews
and those who have been traditionally discriminated against.
My fourth and final major point is that even if employment discrimination laws are unsuccessful, their repeal would be a social disaster.
Think of the message that would be conveyed if we repealed all employment discrimination laws. It would be the government implicitly saying
racism, sexism, and homophobia are acceptable in this society. It would
be giving license to the expression of that. We live in a society already
terribly divided over basic characteristics like race and religion. I can't
imagine any government action that would more tear at the social fabric
9. See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 471; Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982)).
10. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition I: A Broader CongressionalAgenda for
Equal Employment - The Peace Dividend, Leapfrogging, and Other Matters, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 257 (1990).
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and divide a society than repealing them. Even if the employment discrimination laws are nothing but a symbol, their symbol is one society
must continue to have.
History shows that the vilest of ideas can be justified with the
noblest of rhetoric. Today Professor Epstein comes before you with
abstractions. He wants to talk about the market as an abstraction. He
wants to talk about freedom of contract as an abstraction. I think you
have to look at the reality of American society and what the legacy of
discrimination is. We have to say loudly and always that employment
discrimination is unacceptable and the laws must prohibit it.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN'S REBUTTAL
I have only five minutes to answer, and will start by going back to
the beginning. It is not as though the positions I defend have widespread
support in either the Republican or Democratic party. What I find so
enormously ironic is the effort to place the failures of modem race relations at my doorstep when nothing I believe represents current policy
and Professor Chemerinsky's beliefs are dominant on all key issues.
There may be explanations for the current racial tensions, but to attribute them to the market is odd when there is no market operating here at
all-which might explain why the situation has become so bad.
Professor Chemerinsky also misstated my position as to the current
state of affairs. The sentence he quoted referred to overt and institutional
discrimination, and noted that it all was in favor of members of protected
classes, such as women and minorities. I did not say that there was no
individual discrimination, which is how Professor Chemerinsky interpreted my remarks. I think that my original statement is true. I have
not been in any firm or institution that has any formal white male preference. I do not know of any such business; neither does anyone else.
Next Professor Chemerinsky chides me for my devotion to moral
abstractions, and offers his own, namely, that discrimination on the basis
of irrelevant characteristics is impermissible and unacceptable. But he is
strangely silent on whether he favors affirmative action programs. And
we don't know whether he thinks that diversity is a justification for raceand sex-conscious decisions. I suspect that he supports affirmative action
and diversity. I do not know how he squares these beliefs with a thoroughgoing defense of the antidiscrimination principle. Yet somehow in
his denunciation of my position, these issues all fade to the background,
and we once again see the 1964 vision of a color-blind society emerge. I
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thought that I had made it clear that one of the advantages of getting rid
of the antidiscrimination laws in private competitive markets was that it
allowed well-intentioned people who favored these programs to adopt
them if they so chose.
Now we still must ask what would happen if these statutes were
repealed. We are told that there will be a great symbolic failure. I think
that the exact opposite is more likely to occur. If we could explain why
we want to repeal the statutes, we might enjoy a symbolic success.
George Bush may endorse the statutes, but the thought that he is the
moral beacon of our time is an idea that is out of touch with reality. If I
were facing someone as hostile as Professor Chemerinsky or Ted Koppel,
I would stress that these are not color-blind or sex-blind laws. These are
laws that say essentially that we do not believe that blacks and women
can make it on their own. These are laws that say that explicit legal
protection is necessary for their economic success, when in fact it is a
barrier to them. These are laws that say that no employer can do a
decent thing unless hit over the head by the threat of legal suit. I think
that these laws are an insult, or at least an injustice, to every woman,
every black, every Hispanic, who has been able to advance by hard work
and honest effort.
Professor Chemerinsky stresses that in the past there were all sorts
of barriers, many of them informal, to blacks and women who wanted to
advance. But before one endorses the political remedy, it must be recognized that in 1951 no one could have passed any antidiscrimination statute: the votes were not there. But today there is a political majority in
favor of the statutes, so why think that they are needed when there are
huge numbers of employers who actively recruit on a race- and sex-conscious basis?
Professor Chemerinsky also insists that there have been great successes under the civil rights laws. But he does not know the difference
between a change and a success. It may well be that we have turned the
hiring practices of the airline industry inside and out. But when reliable
polling data suggested that ninety-seven percent of your customersmen, women, and children-in 1968 prefer female stewardesses, then
why condemn the firms for responding to these preferences? What else
are they supposed to respond to? Are we supposed to tell people when
they are anxious or under stress that we are less concerned with their
emotions and feelings and more concerned about our abstract ideals? Or
should we try to help them? And if it turns out that these preferences do
change-and I suspect that they would have changed-there is nothing
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that forces the airlines to keep their former policies, and many of them
will change voluntarily.
Professor Chemerinsky also refers to the age discrimination laws. I
can assure each student here that he or she will face enormous barriers to
entry into labor markets because of these statutes. I and others have
worked for hours at the University of Chicago to formulate plans that
will limit their harmful effects so that we can find ways to hire young
people without having to pay senior faculty full salaries, full pensions and
social security long after they have passed their most productive periods.
Why their wages should shoot up while everyone else suffers a decline is
simply beyond me. The age discrimination statutes are bad for you and
bad for society at large. They will create major dislocations in future
years, and you will bear the brunt of it.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY'S REBUTTAL
Professor Epstein just shifted positions enormously. He began by
telling you that all employment discrimination laws should be repealed.
In his rebuttal he shifts away from that and instead wants to argue that
particular aspects of the law are undesirable because affirmative action
programs have a great cost. We are not arguing about whether particular provisions are good or bad. They can be changed. But what we are
arguing about today is whether all employment discrimination laws be
repealed and on this he clearly loses the debate.
I advance these four points. First, that without legal regulation substantial discrimination would exist in the American market system. I
pointed to five flaws in Professor Epstein's reasoning; he responded to
none of them. Instead he says two things: first, he says we have had
racial tensions since 1964 even though we've got the laws, so obviously
the laws have failed.
We have racism in this society, we have sexism in this society, and
as a result we do have racial and sexual tensions in this society. That
doesn't prove that the employment discrimination laws fail. In fact, it's
the very existence of racism and sexism that necessitates the laws prohibiting discrimination. And I believe the tensions would be far greater if
we didn't have the laws, and infinitely greater if the laws are repealed.
Second, he talks about affirmative action and diversity. That's just
not what this debate is about. I'd be glad to invite Professor Epstein
back to debate affirmative action with him. But that's not what we are
talking about here. We are not saying whether or not there should be
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preferences given to minorities or women in hiring. We are talking about
whether or not employers should be prohibited from discriminating on
the basis of race, gender, and religion. And on that ground Professor
Epstein does not deny that the market will inevitably leave
discrimination.
With regard to the last quote from his book that I read, where he
said there is no institutional discrimination except against white males,
he said that he was speaking of institutional discrimination. And that's
my point: that he fails to recognize that institutions--employers-will
discriminate and do discriminate. The discrimination will increase tremendously if there aren't laws prohibiting employment discrimination.
Even if no business has an announced "white-male preference," countless
businesses do discriminate against women and racial minorities.
My second major point was that laws should prohibit employment
discrimination. I tell you in subpoint A that employment discrimination
is a terrible harm. It's harmful to the individual who is discriminated
against, it offends society's notion of equality and is enormously costly to
society.
I tell you in subpoint B that we should interfere with freedom of
contract so as to stop employment discrimination. As I point out, he
only wants to protect employers' freedom of contract. He ignores the
rights of employees to have freedom of contract. And every time an
employer discriminates, the freedom of the employee is compromised.
Moreover, even if it means we are interfering with freedom of contract,
it's worth doing that in order to stop discrimination in this society.
In my third major point I tell you that the laws that prohibit
employment discrimination are successful. There are studies, there are
statistics that prove this. In fact, I suggest that Professor Epstein's own
book proves this. I say for example that the age discrimination act must
be successful if there is an imposed twenty percent cost on the university
budgets.
His response is to tell you that that is a terribly burdensome cost
that will hurt all of you. Well notice there are two points here: First, he
proves therefore that the law is working in eliminating discrimination. It
has to have worked to impose harms on others in order to impose a cost.
The second question: Is it desirable to have that? And that really goes to
whether or not the law is too strict. Maybe we should relax the terms of
the law. Maybe we should have other ways of dealing with that. But the
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fact that age discrimination laws impose those costs refutes his claim that
there is no effect.
I give you the example of the airlines. I said look at all of the ways
with regard to the airlines that the airlines have obviously changed. He
says, well, that assumes it's good. And this is my view: I use the airlines
as an example to show that the laws prohibiting discrimination work.
Once we see that they work we now can talk normatively about whether
that's desirable.
He says, "What about customers? What if ninety-eight percent of
customers only want female flight attendants." I do not believe we
should give in to preferences that are discriminatory. I believe that those
preferences deserve much less weight in our society than we should give
to the right of people to not be discriminated against. I believe that customer preferences should not be a justification for employment discrimination, but our commitment to equality deserves far more weight.
Fourth and finally, I tell you that even if everything else is wrong,
the repeal of employment discrimination laws would be a social disaster.
That would transmit a symbolic message that racism, sexism and antiSemitism are acceptable. Frankly, I found Professor Epstein's book outrageous because I think it fails to account for how evil racism, sexism
and anti-Semitism are in this society, and how essential it is that the
government now and always be against them. Employment discrimination laws must remain on the books. I think Professor Epstein is simply
wrong in urging their repeal.
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